The case against Beattie (I)

I aim at no paradoxes, my prejudices (if certain instinctive suggestions of the understanding may be so called) are in favour of truth, virtue and Christianity, and I have no principles to support, but such as seem to me to have influenced the judgment of the rational part of mankind in all ages of the world. (Essays, Introduction, pp. 3–4)

To say “my prejudices are only in favor of truth and virtue,” if he had stopped there, would, of course, be silly. What opponent of his could possibly accept that? And in case you think he doesn’t seriously imagine that his opponent will accept it, consider what happens a little later on:

I said, that my prejudices are all in favour of truth and virtue. To avow any sort of prejudice, may perhaps startle some readers. If it should, I must here entreat all such to pause a moment, and ask of their own hearts these simple questions. — Are virtue and truth useful to mankind? Are they matters of indifference? Or are they pernicious? (p. 7)

So, this fellow literally thinks he can convince an opponent in this way: I believe in the truth, so, if you believe in the truth, you must agree with me. And that, in a word, is silly.

But, alas, it is not exactly true, or not the whole truth, that he previously said “that my prejudices are all in favour of truth and virtue.” What he said was: “my prejudices … are in favour of truth, virtue and Christianity.” I don’t know how many of my readers have had the pleasure of arguing with political or religious fanatics — obviously these are become scarce in our enlightened times — but, if you have not, I can inform you that the sentiment above expressed is not unique to Beattie. This is just what any silly, bigoted fellow will tell you. Often they will even claim not to have a particular political or religious position at all: how many times have I heard someone say that they have no interest in politics, that they are guided only by (for example) pure ahavat Yisrael, the love of (the people) Israel? But, leaving aside that their ahavat Yisrael may turn out not to be very tolerant of Reform or Conservative Judaism, or of left wing Israeli political parties (if there still are any of those), etc. — any non-Jew, at least, should be able to immediately spot how extreme a political view this actually is. A person who considers, so to speak, “Jews First” to be beyond all reasonable political controversy is not, clearly, someone with whom a non-Jew can engage in rational discourse. And we find the exact same telltale sign here: how can a non-Christian have any rational discussion with someone who thinks Christianity is an “instinctive suggestion of the understanding” and also that Christianity has been embraced by “the rational part of mankind” in all ages? But, we should note, not just any Christianity! This is how he treats St. Thomas, a Doctor of the Church:

A verbal disputant! what claim can he have to do with the laws of nature, with the observation of facts, with life and manners! Let him not intrude upon the company of men of science, but repose, with his brethren Aquinas and Suares, in the corner of some Gothic cloister, dark as his understanding, and cold as his heart. (p. 4)[1]These sentences are not exactly spoken in Beattie’s own voice — rather, they are spoken by some ridiculous straw man opponent who claims that there is these days no problem of confusing verbal with substantive disagreement (is that supposed to be Locke? Hume?). But Beattie does agree with the nasty part, as becomes clear a little later: “One kind of jargon is laid aside; but another has been adopted, more fashionable indeed, but not less frivolous” (p. 6).

So, it turns out that rational people in all ages, prompted by instinctive suggestions of the understanding, which can hardly be called “prejudices” at all — I mean, they’re just what any (normal) person would accept! — have taken for granted that Beattie’s particular brand of Protestant Christianity is the true religion. This fellow, in other words, is not only silly, but also bigoted. QED